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Abstract
Since the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, casinos on reservations have 
become lucrative sources of income for not only tribal governments but also state 
governments. With an increase in wealth, many tribes have increased their lobbying forces 
to become major political actors in state and federal government. But, while some tribal 
governments have become financially stable due to gaming others have become physically 
and economically isolated making some tribal governments extremely poor. Poor tribal 
governments continue to have problems and when lobbying is not an option grassroots 
movements such as protests become the most viable source of political clout. By 
examining the political power of both wealthy and poor tribal governments it can be 
determined that wealthy tribes are more successful with traditional lobbying while poor 
tribes are more successful with social movements.
The Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), was passed by Congress in 1988, this act set 
the stage for tribal government-owned gaming facilities (Akee, Spilde, Taylor, 2015). The 
passage of the IGRA gave many tribes economic sovereignty and the opportunity to 
establish themselves as self-sufficient nations. Prior to the actual passage of the IGRA 
federal courts had ruled on several cases between Indian gaming establishments and state 
governments, the most notable of these cases was California v. Cabazon Band of Mission 
Indians (480 US 202 [1987]). In this case, the US Supreme Court ruled that (p. 203): 
The federal interests in Indian self-government, including the goal of encouraging 
tribal self-sufficiency and economic development, are important, and federal agencies, 
acting under federal laws, have sought to implement them by promoting and 
overseeing tribal bingo and gambling enterprises. Such policies and actions are of 
particular relevance in this case since the tribal games provide the sole source of 
revenues for the operation of the tribal governments and are the major sources of 
employment for tribal members.
Thus, the Supreme Court acknowledges that gaming operations are the major source of 
employment and income for many tribal members. This acknowledgment also promotes 
Indian self-government, showing that the US policy had shifted towards granting 
American Indian sovereignty through the economic means of gaming establishments. But 
what happens when gaming operations aren’t successful on reservations? 
For the basis of this poster, tribes will be categorized into two groups: poor tribes (tribes 
that have not generated considerable revenue from gaming establishments) and wealthy 
tribes (tribes that have generated considerable revenue from gaming establishments).
Classification
● By using the National Indian 
Gaming Commission’s data on the 
Gross Gaming Revenue Reports for 
the 2018 fiscal year, tribes can be 
divided into categories of poor and 
wealthy (NIGC, 2019).
● Poor tribes are classified by having 
their tribal gaming revenue be less 
than $25 million per year, because 
this results in a median income of 
<$16,280.
● Wealthy tribes are classified by their 
tribal gaming revenue by more than 
$25 million per year, because this 
results in a median income of 
>$33,580. 
Figure 1.1: The majority of tribes in the US are 
classified as “Poor Tribes,” under the previously 
mentioned gaming revenues criteria. With the total 
number of tribes in this data (n=501) the majority is 
classified as being poor tribes (n=287) and the minority 
being wealthy tribes (n=214). So, according to this data, 
the majority of American Indian tribes in the US do 
not generate considerable revenue from gaming 
revenues. 
Figure 1.1
The Political Clout of Wealthy American Indian Tribes
When tribal governments become wealthy from gaming revenues they’re afforded 
certain privileges that poorer tribes do not have. But, with these exclusive privileges 
comes the pressure of maintaining these advantages. In order to hold onto the wealth 
(and other advantages) created by gaming revenue wealthy tribes have established 
themselves as significant political actors. Since the success of the IGRA (for some 
tribal governments), many tribes have used traditional lobbying to increase their 
political clout. According to William E. Schulter, lobbying “entails a group of 
individuals or entities with a common affiliation working in concert to achieve a 
favorable result” (Schulter, 2017). When an Indian tribal government has a connection 
with lawmakers, via lobbying, it is more likely for political action to occur in favor of 
that tribal government.
The Puyallup Tribe of Indians
The Political Clout of Poor American Indian Tribes
While many tribes have had economic success from the results of the passage of the 
IGRA, the majority of tribal governments do not generate considerable revenue from 
gaming. In order to have a political voice in modern times, these poorer tribes can not 
depend on traditional lobbying, so instead many tribes rely on social movements. Suh 
Doowon explains that social movements “provide an institutional route to influence 
state policy‐making and allows movement groups to forge political alliances with 
reformist power elites within polity” (Doowon, 2006). Social movements can take the 
form of protests, social media campaigns, or even boycotts. Without considerable 
revenue from gaming poor American Indian Tribes increase their political clout by 
these types of social movements. 
Standing Rock
The Dakota Access Pipeline (the DAPL) was proposed to carry approximately 450,000 
barrels of crude oil per day from the Bakken oil fields in North Dakota down to Illinois--it 
would stretch 1,134 miles (Privott, 2019). The No Dakota Access Pipeline (#NoDAPL) 
movement began because the Standing Rock Sioux reservation refused to allow that 
DAPL to cross their tribal land and waterways (Privott). This refusal led to protests which 
became a much larger social and political movement. Although the DAPL came to fruition 
the movement that surrounded it became a blueprint for many other poor American Indian 
Tribes, as a proven method to increase their political clout. 
The Puyallup Tribe is located in western Washington state, they have an enrolled 
population of 4,000, of which 2,500 live on the reservation (NPAIHB, 2015). The 
Puyallup tribe is considered a very urban reservation and offers a wide spectrum of 
services and care for their population, mostly funded from revenue by their casinos, most 
notably the Emerald Queen Casino. The revenue that has been generated from the 
Emerald Queen Casino has helped finance many social programs offered on the 
reservation, but more notably it has given the Puyallup the opportunity to engage in 
traditional lobbying. From 2019 to 2020 the Puyallup Tribe of Indians spent $1,464,559 in 
lobbying (OpenSecrets, 2020). For a tribe with only 4,000 enrolled members that is a lot 
of money to give to government officials, and it gives those members a very loud political 
voice. 
Conclusion
Since the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, many tribes 
have expanded their political activity because of an increase in gaming 
revenue. But the majority of American Indian Tribes are still considered 
poor. Overall, American Indian Tribes have increased their political 
clout. Wealthy tribes do this by means of traditional lobbying like that 
of the Puyallup Tribe of Indians. While poor tribes resort to activist 
movements like those seen at Standing Rock.
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